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Individuals hold health insurance as a form of financial security against the risk of 
incurring large out-of-pocket medical expenses. In 2011, 18 percent of the non-elderly 
US population was uninsured, with young adults between the ages of 19 and 25 
disproportionately uninsured (Fronstin, 2012). The Census Bureau (2012) reports that 
28 percent of young adults did not have health insurance in 2011, exposing 
themselves to significant financial risk for treating unexpected or serious illnesses. 
Compared to the insured population, the uninsured population not only has poorer 
access to health care but is also more likely to build up large medical bills when 
seeking necessary medical care. The uninsured population generally has lower 
incomes and smaller savings; hence, these medical bills can easily translate to medical 
debt. Himmelstein et al. (2005) estimated that over half of personal bankruptcies in 
the U.S. are due to medical reasons.  
 Between 2008 and 2011, the share of uninsured non-elderly Americans rose 
from 16.8 percent to 18.0 percent (Fronstin, 2012). At the same time, the share of 
young adults between 19 and 25 years of age without health insurance fell from 31.7 
percent to 28.2 percent (Census, 2012). Against a trend of falling insurance coverage 
over time for the non-elderly population as a whole, young adults have recently 
gained new health insurance options under extended parental coverage laws. These 
laws, which were adopted by 35 states between 1994 and 2009, allow young adults to 
remain on their parents’ private health insurance plans until they reach a certain age. 
Starting in September 2010, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extended this coverage 
to all young people up to the age of 26 in all 50 states. 
 Having large medical bills can be a significant source of financial distress. Of 
individuals who sought financial counseling in 2010, approximately 20 percent of 
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them cited medical debt as their primary reason for thinking of declaring bankruptcy 
(New York Times, 08/18/2011). A Kaiser Family Foundation (2010) report found one 
in four Americans faced difficulties in paying medical bills for their household and 54 
percent of all individuals surveyed delayed needed medical care because of its 
associated costs. Among the uninsured respondents, the report found 85 percent of 
people put off needed care because of cost concerns. The economic and personal 
consequences of having medical debt can be severe. Some individuals may be able to 
recover from their debt burden. Others may not be so fortunate and their medical debt 
could permanently reduce their standard of living. Since the purpose of having health 
insurance is to provide financial protection from large unexpected medical bills, we 
hypothesize that expansions in dependent coverage laws would lead to decreases in 
the likelihood of negative financial outcomes. In this study, we make use of a natural 
experiment resulting from variation in the timing of the implementation of extended 
parental coverage laws across the U.S. states.  
Previous studies have established that state level parental coverage laws and 
the ACA increase insurance coverage among young adults (Levine, McKnight, and 
Heep, 2011; Antwi, Moriya, and Simon, 2013). However there exists no study 
exploring the impact of extended parental coverage laws on financial distress. A few 
studies have examined the effect of other expansions in coverage, including Medicaid 
expansions and the Massachusetts Health Reform, on financial outcomes (Gross and 
Notowidigdo, 2011; Mazumder and Miller, 2014), but the effect of parental coverage 
laws could be different from these results because these laws apply to a different 
population. The population affected by parental coverage laws may have higher 
incomes than the population affected by Medicaid expansions. In addition, these laws 
affect Americans across many states (as opposed to just one state such as 
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Massachusetts). The aim of this paper is to explore how these laws and an early 
mandate from the ACA affect the financial outcomes of young adults. These outcome 
measures include: whether an individual has declared bankruptcy, whether an 
individual has investment income, whether he or she reports difficulty paying for their 
necessities, difficulty paying medical bills, or having used up most or all of his or her 
savings on medical bills. We construct a financial hardship index for the latter three 
outcome measures that refer to self-reports of financial difficulties. 
 In this thesis, we use a reduced form approach to estimate the impact of these 
laws on financial outcomes. Specifically, we exploit both state level expansions in 
health insurance eligibility and a federal level expansion in health insurance eligibility 
for young adults. We analyze the impact of these laws using data from the 
Commonwealth Fund Biennial Health Insurance Survey (BHIS) for the years 2001-
2012. In our regression analyses, we find that being eligible for health insurance 
through dependent coverage reduces bankruptcies dramatically by 4.5 percentage 
points, relative to being ineligible. Given the bankruptcy rate among young adults in 
our sample is 6.8 percent, this eligibility effect is huge; it translates to a 70 percent 
decrease in the risk of bankruptcies for the eligible group compared to the ineligible 
group. 
Our main results are robust. We test for robustness in several ways. First, we 
use an older group of people who would not be eligible for the parental coverage 
provisions and confirm that there is no effect of the law on bankruptcy rates for this 
ineligible population. Second, we conduct a falsification exercise where we treat the 
law as going into effect three years before its actual implementation date. We find no 
effect of this hypothetical law, which suggests there is no differential trend in the 
bankruptcy rate between the eligible and ineligible group in states that adopted the 
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hypothetical laws. Finally, we explore this more formally by conducting an event 
study that looks at the effect of the laws for a narrow period three years before and 
after its implementation; again, there is no differential effect on bankruptcy rates 
before the law is passed.  
 The results of other financial outcome measures, including having used all of 
one’s savings, having difficulties paying medical bills, and having difficulties paying 
for necessities, are largely mixed. These results are less significant and less robust 
than the pronounced results for bankruptcy. We conduct an analysis with new data 
from the American Community Survey (ACS) to see if the passing of the laws at 
different times happens to be associated with increases in reported investment 
income, as a positive measure of financial income (for which data is available). These 
results, however, are not supportive of our hypothesis that the laws improved 
financial outcomes generally. Thus we perceive the laws as mainly alleviating 
financial distress. 
 The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: Section II provides background 
information on health insurance coverage in the U.S., expansions in state level 
dependent coverage and the relevant provision of the ACA, and bankruptcy laws. 
Section III reviews previous research on the effects of health insurance expansions on 
financial outcomes. Section IV describes our empirical strategy and the data. Section 
V presents our main results, and Section VI explains the robustness checks. Section 
VII concludes.  
 
II. Background 
A. Health Insurance Coverage in the U.S. 
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In the U.S., there are two ways of obtaining health insurance. Individuals receive 
public insurance if they meet eligibility requirements or they can obtain private 
coverage through an employer (also known as group insurance) or by directly 
purchasing insurance (non-group insurance). The largest public insurance programs 
are Medicare and Medicaid; the government provides Medicare for individuals over 
the age of 65 and Medicaid for low-income individuals, families with children, and 
pregnant women, whose yearly income is below a specified level and meet certain 
categorical eligibility requirement1. The State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP) provides health insurance for children whose family’s income level makes 
them just ineligible for Medicaid. In 2011, 22.5 percent of the non-elderly population 
in the US was enrolled in a public insurance program (Fronstin, 2012).  
The majority of health insurance coverage in the U.S. is employer based; 54.8 
percent of the non-elderly population obtains insurance through their employers 
(Fronstin, 2012). A small portion of the non-elderly population, or 7.1 percent, 
purchase health insurance plans on the individual market (Fronstin, 2012). This means 
the remaining subset of the population is uninsured; this group of individuals typically 
have income levels just above the cutoff for Medicaid, are too young to qualify for 
Medicare, or do not satisfy the categorical requirements to be eligible for other public 
programs. At the same time they are unable to obtain employer-sponsored insurance.  
The uninsured made up 18 percent of the non-elderly population in 2011; 
much of this population is the “working poor” (Gruber, 2011). Even with the option 
of directly purchasing insurance, many individuals and families of this group opt out 
due to cost concerns. In 2010, the average premium in the individual market costs 
$3,606 for single plans and $7,102 for family plans (Deloitte, 2011); this premium is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The ACA expanded Medicaid eligibility to all individuals who have incomes below 133 percent of 
the Federal Poverty Line (FPL), regardless of whether they would have been categorically eligible. 
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baseline estimate and it reflects the cost for a healthier than average population as 
some states allow insurers to exclude individuals with pre-existing conditions from 
coverage. Compared to the average premium for a single individual enrolled in 
employer-sponsored insurance, $5,049 in 2009, or a family enrolled in employer-
sponsored insurance, $13,770 in 2009, the individual market premiums are 
significantly lower (Deloitte, 2011). This suggests insurance premiums are 
prohibitively high for those who are uninsured and sick. These individuals may not be 
able to purchase insurance at any price because the market for insurance discriminates 
against sick individuals; many insurers have “pre-existing conditions exclusion” 
clauses that exclude from coverage any spending on illnesses that are present at the 
time the insurance was purchased. Hence individuals outside of employer-based 
insurance and public insurance programs would face significant financial risk from 
falling ill (Gruber, 2011). This is particularly significant for young adults who, as a 
cohort, are disproportionately uninsured. While young adults are generally healthier 
than older adults, they may still experience negative shocks to their health, for 
example from an accident or cancer diagnosis. Hence they are still susceptible to 
financial shocks.  
B. Extended Parental Coverage Laws 
States have expanded both public and private health insurance coverage among 
children, teens, and young adults. In the 1990s, more children became eligible for 
Medicaid coverage as part of poverty-related expansions in the program. The State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) was introduced in 1997 and it 
expanded coverage for children whose family incomes were too high to qualify for 
Medicaid. Of particular interest for this study, several states passed extended parental 
coverage laws starting in the mid-1990s, which increased the age of dependency and 
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allowed adult children to remain on their parents’ private health insurance plans for a 
longer period of time. This private insurance mandate is a way for state governments 
to increase health insurance coverage without new public spending. The costs of such 
mandates are generally shifted to employee wages (Gruber, 1994) and the government 
can justify the implementation of these mandates on paternalistic grounds (Summers, 
1989) as employers and employees may not adequately insure unless the government 
forces them to.  
Table 1 presents a list of states that have passed extended parental coverage 
laws and their corresponding cutoff age for dependency along with requirements on 
marital status. The average age limit for dependency is 25 years old in states that 
passed expanded dependent coverage laws;2 the lowest age limit is 23 years old and 
the oldest is 31 years old. Almost all states require dependents to be unmarried. By 
the end of 2009, 35 states have implemented extended parental coverage laws. There 
are several other restrictions that may disqualify a young adult from parental health 
insurance coverage. These include restrictions on student status, number of 
dependents, and state residency statuses. Some of these restrictions differ conditional 
on other statuses. For example, Illinois expanded dependent coverage for unmarried 
young adults under the age of 26 and for military veterans under the age of 30. For 
our empirical analysis, we will focus on just the age and marital status requirements 
for non-veterans.  
 Eligibility for dependent health insurance under parental coverage laws is 
determined not only by meeting certain restrictions, but also by characteristics of the 
parents’ insurance plans. Parents with employer-sponsored insurance may hold self-
insured plans, which means employers bear the financial risk of illness by insuring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This means coverage expires on the dependent’s 25th birthday. 
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their employees. Under the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act (ERISA), 
self-insured plans are exempt from state-level health insurance regulation. Instead, 
self-insured plans are exclusively regulated at the federal level. Out of the population 
of employer-sponsored plans, 55 percent of employees are covered by self-insured 
health plans (Pierron and Fronstin, 2008).3 This means a large portion of the 
population with employer-sponsored health insurance cannot extend coverage to their 
dependents despite expansions in state laws allowing them to do so.  
 President Obama signed the ACA into law on March 23, 2010 and one of the 
first provisions of this reform to go into effect was the federal extension of parental 
coverage to all individuals under the age of 26. The ACA was designed to improve 
access to health care, especially for individuals who were ineligible for public 
insurance and were not offered insurance by employers. The ACA requires that 
individuals be insured or otherwise pay a penalty. To facilitate individuals satisfying 
this requirement, the government expanded access to public and private health 
insurance through Medicaid expansions, subsidies for low- and middle-income 
individuals to purchase private insurance, and a mandate that firms with more than 
fifty employees offer insurance coverage or pay a fee. The ACA extended coverage to 
two types of young adults living in states with a state parental coverage law. One type 
of young adults being those who were not personally eligible for coverage, for 
example, those who were under the age requirement but were married (in a state 
where marriage is a disqualifying condition). The second type being children of 
parents with self-insured plans. The ACA also expanded parental coverage to all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 ERISA exempts coverage offered by religious organizations government employers (Pierron and 
Fronstin, 2008). 
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young adults under age 26 in states that had not yet passed an extended coverage 
law.4  
C. U.S. Bankruptcy Code 
One of our measures of financial distress is whether an individual has declared 
bankruptcy. Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, individuals can file for bankruptcy 
under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 protection. Bankruptcies under Chapter 7 eliminate 
dischargeable debt while bankruptcies under Chapter 13 establish a payment plan for 
debt. Chapter 7 bankruptcies allow trustees to take over the assets of a debtor’s estate 
and reduce them to cash to distribute to creditors. After the liquidation process in 
most Chapter 7 cases, the debtor receives a discharge that releases him or her from 
personal liability for certain dischargeable debt, including debt incurred because of 
medical reasons.5  
Recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Code have made it harder for 
individuals to file for Chapter 7 protection; the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 requires courts to apply a “means test” to determine 
whether individual debtors qualify to file under Chapter 7. If debtors have an income 
over a certain threshold, they fail the means test and become ineligible to file for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 7.6 Figure 1 shows the U.S. bankruptcy rate between 1990 
and 2012; the sharp decline in the rate between the years 2005 and 2006 reflects the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Prior to March 2010, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) stipulated that exclusions of health insurance 
premiums for dependents from taxable income applied only to dependents under the age of 19 or under 
the age of 24 if they are students. Under the ACA, this section of the IRS tax code was amended so that 
health coverage provided for an employee’s child under the age of 27 would be tax-free, regardless of 
whether the child is considered a tax dependent.	  
5 Dischargeable debts are obligations that can be eliminated or forgiven; debtors are no longer 
obligated to pay the discharged debt and creditors cannot come after the debtor. Dischargeable debts 
include credit card debt, utility bills, auto accidents claims (unless the accident was due to drunk 
driving). Examples of non-dischargeable debt include debts for child support or alimony, criminal 
restitution, debts to government agencies, and student loans (except in rare cases) (US Courts 2014). 
6 Debtors with incomes below the state median are eligible to file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection; 
debtors with incomes above the state median with a certain level of disposable income are ineligible to 
file for Chapter 7. 
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change in the Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 7 bankruptcies accounted for 70 percent of 
individual bankruptcy filings in 2004, but this figure dropped to 60 percent in 2006.  
 Because of more stringent laws, many debtors now file for Chapter 13 
protection, which is also known as Individual Debt Adjustment. Filing under Chapter 
13 allows individuals with a regular income to develop a repayment plan with 
creditors to repay all or part of their debts over a span of three to five years. Unlike 
Chapter 7 bankruptcies, filing under Chapter 13 allows debtors to save their houses 
from foreclosure.  
 Debtors with large medical bills may choose to file under Chapter 7 or 
Chapter 13 depending on the size of their assets. Debtors with low income and small 
assets qualify to file under Chapter 7. In this case, their dischargeable debt disappears. 
Debtors with higher incomes and large assets are ineligible to file under Chapter 7, so 
they have to repay part of their medical debt. Studies have estimated that over half of 
consumer bankruptcies are caused by medical reasons (Himmelstein et al., 2005).  
 
III. Prior Literature 
Two lines of literature are relevant for our research. One line examines the impact of 
medical costs and health insurance eligibility on various financial outcomes. The 
other line studies the effect of expansions for health insurance on rates of coverage.  
 One study in the first line of the literature aims to analyze how health 
insurance affects bankruptcy. Himmelstein et al. (2005) found that over half of all 
personal bankruptcies in 2001 were due to medical reasons. In interviews with 
bankruptcy filers, the authors find 54.5 percent of respondents cited “any medical 
cause” as the reason they declared bankruptcy. A concern with this study is that the 
authors define “any medical cause” broadly; this measure includes not only having 
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large medical bills or having to forfeit income as a result of illness or injury, but also 
facing addictions, uncontrolled gambling, a birth, or a death in the family as a medical 
cause for bankruptcy. In addition, attempts to replicate this study have yielded 
significantly different results. Dranove and Millenson (2006) examined the data and 
find that medical bills contribute to only 17 percent of personal bankruptcies.  
A broader concern with Himmelstein et al. (2005)’s study is that it does not 
employ quasi-experimental tools to investigate a causal effect of medical expenses on 
bankruptcies. It does not address the common empirical problem of endogeneity; 
medical bills may be correlated with bankruptcy outcomes through unobserved 
factors such as an individuals’ risk preference. Indeed Mahoney (2012) finds 
individuals file for bankruptcy as an implicit form of health insurance. Households 
with greater sizable assets are more likely to hold health insurance. But households 
with lower sizeable assets can implicitly have “bankruptcy insurance” that may crowd 
out conventional health insurance coverage. Because Chapter 7 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code allows households to discharge medical debt in exchange for giving 
up nonexempt property, households with fewer assets may perceive health insurance 
as less valuable. This implicit insurance from bankruptcy may distort the insurance 
coverage decision.  
 A recent study overcomes the problem of endogenity in determining the 
impact of medical costs on bankruptcy by using plausibly exogenous variation. Gross 
and Notowidigdo (2011) use a quasi-experimental approach to investigate the relative 
importance of medical costs in the bankruptcy decision using exogenous variation 
from expansions in Medicaid and the SCHIP. The authors use bankruptcy data from 
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and they use a constructed measure of 
public insurance eligibility from the Current Population Survey. The authors find that 
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a 10 percentage point increase in Medicaid eligibility leads to an 8 percent reduction 
in declaring consumer bankruptcy.  
 Several studies examine the effect of Medicaid eligibility on financial 
outcomes. Results generally show that expansions in Medicaid lead to decreases in 
several measures of financial difficulties. Finkelstein et al. (2012) study the first year 
outcomes of the Oregon Health Plan lottery, which randomly assigned the eligibility 
to apply for Medicaid to individuals. The authors find a negative ‘local average 
treatment effect,’ meaning that eligible individuals who received Medicaid had 
reductions in financial difficulties. Individuals who received Medicaid as part of the 
Oregon Medicaid expansion were 20 percentage points less likely to have out-of-
pocket expenses and 15 percentage points less likely to have to borrow money or skip 
paying bills as a result of medical costs. Baicker et al. (2013) find that two years after 
the Oregon Health Plan lottery, individuals still had lower incidences of negative 
financial outcomes. More precisely, Baicker et al. (2013) find Medicaid coverage to 
be associated with a 15.3 percentage point decrease in out-of-pocket spending and a 
14 percentage point decrease in having to borrow money or skip bill payments. 
Interestingly, the authors find catastrophic expenditures, defined as out-of-pocket 
medical spending exceeding 30 percent of income, decline by 4.5 percentage points. 
Compared to the sample mean, this result means catastrophic expenditures are nearly 
eliminated as a result of taking up Medicaid by the eligible population.  
 However, Finkelstein et al. (2012) did not find evidence of a relationship 
between coverage eligibility and bankruptcy outcomes, and Baicker et al. (2013) did 
not investigate this relationship. 
 Researchers have also examined the impact of state specific expansions 
(outside of Oregon) in health insurance eligibility on financial outcomes. For instance, 
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Mazumder and Miller (2014) study the impact of the 2006 Massachusetts Health 
Reform Law on financial distress. The authors use panel data of individuals from a 
national credit-reporting agency and find the Massachusetts reform improved several 
measures of financial outcomes including credit scores, delinquencies, fraction of 
debt past due, and incidences of personal bankruptcy. These results, however, may be 
specific to Massachusetts or influenced by the timing of the reform (occurring just 
before the recent recession), which makes it difficult to extrapolate their findings for 
the entire country. 
 There are several advantages to analyzing expansions in parental coverage. 
First, these state and federal laws generate plausibly exogenous variation in insurance 
coverage, which may be used to explore the causal effect of access to health insurance 
on financial outcomes. Second, these laws are particularly relevant because the 
population affected by them more closely resembles the target population for the 
ACA (that is, uninsured adults). Rather than study the impact of eligibility on 
uninsured individuals with incomes below the Federal Poverty Line (FPL), as per the 
Oregon Health Plan lottery, or low-income children and pregnant women (Gross and 
Notowidigdo, 2011), we analyze the impact of expanded insurance access on financial 
outcomes for all young adults. Hence our findings can be informative of the impact of 
the ACA. To our knowledge, no previous studies have used this variation in parental 
insurance coverage across states to study a causal effect of access to medical 
insurance on financial outcomes. 
In addition, we use a broad measure of financial distress to capture many 
dimensions of individual’s financial profile. A considerable amount of attention has 
been paid to research on severe financial distress, such as bankruptcy. However, it is 
valuable to understand how health insurance affects less severe, but more common, 
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sources of financial distress such as the ability to pay for basic necessities and 
whether one has used up all of their savings in paying medical bills. Because our 
research considers a range of financial outcomes, our results would give a broad 
overview of the effect of health insurance eligibility on individual finances.  
 Turning to the next relevant line of literature, a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for our research is that expansions in health insurance eligibility affect the 
take up rate of health insurance. Levine, McKnight, and Heep (2011) find the 
introduction of SCHIP increased insurance coverage by 3 percentage points for older 
teenagers; teenagers under 150 percent and those between 150 and 300 percent of the 
FPL experienced 7 and 4 percentage point increases in health insurance coverage 
respectively. These results reflect roughly a 20 percent reduction in rates of 
uninsurance for these two groups. Similarly, the authors find state level expansions in 
parental coverage laws lead to a 3 percentage point decrease in the uninsurance rate 
among the eligible population. Based on these results, the authors hypothesize a 
federal level expansion in parental coverage would have an even larger percentage 
point decrease in the uninsurance rate among the eligible population. This is because 
the federal expansion would allow parents with self-insured plans to cover their adult 
dependents.  
 Antwi, Moriya, and Simon (2012) continue with Levine, McKnight, and Heep 
(2011)’s hypothesis and find that the early provision of the ACA, which expanded 
dependent coverage to young adults under age 26 in all states, leads to a 3.2 
percentage point drop in the rate of uninsurance for individuals between the ages of 
19 and 25 relative to their control group. This control group consists of individuals 
between 16 and 18 years of age and between 27 and 29 years of age.  
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 Results from both studies show that expansions in health insurance eligibility 
improved take up of the health insurance. Cantor et al. (2012) confirms these findings 
and show the early provision of the ACA increased young adult dependent coverage 
by 5.3 percentage points, which the authors find to be equivalent to a 3.5 percentage 
point decrease in the rate of uninsurance. Moreover, the authors find the decline in the 
uninsurance rate to be more pronounced among young adults affected by both state 
laws and the ACA. This could be due to increased awareness of such laws in states 
with both reforms. 
 Much of the research on expansions of health insurance eligibility has focused 
on its effect on health utilization and health outcomes. Less attention has been paid to 
its impact on financial outcomes, which arguably, is the purpose for which individuals 
have insurance. We hope to use these expansions in insurance access to examine its 
causal impact on financial outcomes. Specifically, we hope to find an effect of 
implementing dependent coverage laws on financial distress via financial outcomes 
such as incidence of bankruptcy, difficulties paying medical bills and paying for 
necessities, and use of savings.  
 
IV. Data and Methodology 
We use two data sets for the empirical analysis: The Commonwealth Fund Biennial 
Health Insurance Survey (BHIS) and the American Community Survey (ACS).  
A. Commonwealth Fund Biennial Health Insurance Survey 
The Commonwealth Fund Biennial Health Insurance survey (BHIS) is a novel micro 
data set managed by the Commonwealth Fund and is conducted every two years. For 
our analyses, we use data from the 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2010, and 2012 surveys to 
examine the impact of health care coverage on financial outcomes. The BHIS has 
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detailed information on individual health insurance coverage and financial behavior. 
This data set has publicly available state identifiers and age identifiers, which allow 
us to take advantage of state level variation in expansions of dependent coverage 
laws. The BHIS surveys adults in the continental U.S. over the age of 19. Since the 
upper limit of the age restriction for dependent coverage in 31 years of age in some 
states, we restrict our sample to adults between 19 and 30 years of age.  
 Each survey interviews between 3,000 and 4,000 individuals and this sample 
is designed to generalize to the U.S. adult population age 19 and older. Restricting the 
sample to those ages 19 to 30 and pooling across all sample years yields a final 
sample size of 4,196. Table 2 shows 56.4 percent of our restricted sample are female 
and 62.9 percent are white and the average age is 24.7. Approximately one third of 
the restricted sample is married and around half of them are full-time employees. 
Approximately 6.8 percent of the sample have declared bankruptcy due to medical 
reasons and a quarter of the sample have had difficulties paying their or their family’s 
medical bills. 20 percent of the sample has used up their savings trying to pay medical 
bills and 15 percent have difficulties paying for basic necessities as a result of their 
medical bills. Our constructed financial hardship index (discussed in detail later) has a 
mean of 0.13; each component of the index was standardized to a mean of 0 and 
standard deviation of 1. 28.8 percent of the sample does not have health insurance. Of 
the survey participants who do have insurance, 74.5 percent of them hold private 
insurance while 31.3 percent are enrolled in a public program. These percentages add 
to over 100 percent because individuals may hold both public and private insurance. 
In the design of these surveys, samples were disproportionately stratified to target 
low-income, African-American and Hispanic households. 
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 The BHIS’s main advantage is it includes data on financial behavior, while 
also including state identifiers (unlike many other surveys of household finances, such 
as the Survey of Consumer Finances). Since the financial behavior questions vary 
somewhat across survey years, we focus on four main questions regarding financial 
outcomes that can be defined reasonably consistently over time. The first question 
asks, During the last 12 months, were there times when you had problems paying or 
were you unable to pay for medical bills? Responses were either yes or no, or the 
respondent refused to answer the question. The next three questions are similarly 
dichotomous: Have you ever been unable to pay for basic necessities like food, heat, 
or rent because of medical bills? Have you ever used up all your savings because of 
medical bills? and Have you had to declare bankruptcy because of medical bills? In 
earlier surveys before 2007, these three questions asked respondents if they ever had 
to face these outcomes at any point in their lives. After 2007, the phrasing of the 
survey question changed and they asked if the respondents have experienced any 
outcome in the past two years. In our analysis, we ignore this change in the question 
wording in order to be able to use all years of the BHIS data.7 
 Because we have several outcome measures that are similar, we create a 
summary index of financial hardship that aggregates these outcome measures. Using 
this index improves the statistical power of the analysis and gives us better overview 
of an individual’s financial health. It is plausible that the outcomes are not mutually 
exclusive and that if an individual is experiencing difficulties in one aspect of their 
finances, they may also be experiencing difficulties in another dimension. Hence, 
including a financial hardship index would be appropriate. We create this index by 
equally weighting averages across standardized z-score measures of each dependent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 In theory, the year fixed effects (described below) should be able to handle any difference in the mean 
rate of bankruptcy that might occur due to this change in question wording. 
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variable; the dependent variables we include are difficulties paying bills, difficulties 
paying necessities, and whether the respondent used all their savings towards paying 
medical bills. These outcomes are similar in nature and when indexed together, give 
us a good overview on an individual’s financial profile. 
B. American Community Survey 
We use data from the American Community Survey (ACS) between the years 2001 
and 2012 to complement our analyses of financial distress in the BHIS. The ACS 
contains information on investment income, which is valuable in our analysis of 
financial outcomes. An advantage to using the ACS is it has a large sample size and 
many demographic variables. However, investment income is the only possible 
outcome variable we can use because the ACS has no information on asset holdings 
(or bankruptcy or other measures of financial distress); investment income can be 
viewed as an indirect measure of asset holdings and thus a proxy for overall financial 
health. The ACS is a nationally representative annual sample of individuals and as per 
our treatment of the BHIS we restricted this sample to adults between the ages of 19 
and 30, generating a final sample size of 3,998,806.  
Table 3 gives a summary of the ACS sample; the average age is 24.4, 50.1 
percent of the sample are female, and 73.5 percent are white. Approximately 28.6 
percent of our sample is married and the average annual income is $18,400. Around 
5.8 percent of our sample has nonzero investment income and the average amount of 
this income is $188. Investment income in this context is defined as the pre-tax 
money respondents received or loss in the form of income from an estate, trust, 
interest, dividends, royalties and rents. This is bottom coded at -$9,999 and top coded 
at the 99.5th percentile within each state. Values higher than the 99.5th percentile are 
the state means of all the cases above this cutoff. We drop observations of negative 
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investment income (0.11 percent of the sample). With the ACS, we explore both the 
impact of young adult dependent coverage laws on the level of investment income 
and if individuals are likely to have investment income. We also explore whether 
individuals are likely to have investment income over $2,000.  
The key independent variable in our regression analysis is an indicator for 
whether an individual was eligible for health insurance coverage under extended 
parental coverage laws. In our analyses, eligibility is determined by state, year, age, 
and marital status; that is, the eligible dummy is set to one only for individuals who 
are actually eligible based on their personal characteristics. We coded the year of 
implementation of the law to be one year later than the actual implementation. This is 
to account for our survey questions that normally ask individuals to consider activities 
that have occurred in the prior year and to account for laws that may have passed 
towards the end of a calendar year. 
C. Methodology 
We employ a reduced form approach to take advantage of the exogenous variation 
generated by expansions in dependent coverage. Our regression specification can be 
expressed as:  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!"# =  ∝ +𝛽𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒!"# + 𝛿𝑋!"# + 𝛾! + 𝛾! + 𝜀!"#     (1) 
where 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!"# is a measure of financial outcome for individual i in state s and 
year t. Within the BHIS, there are several outcome variables including whether the 
individual has declared bankruptcy, has had difficulties paying for necessities, has 
used up most or all of his or her savings, and whether the individual has been unable 
to pay their medical bills, and the financial hardship index. The independent variable 
of interest, 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒!"#, is an indicator for being eligible for health insurance coverage 
under the extended parental coverage law in state s and time t. This regression 
23	  
includes a full set of year and state fixed effects to control for any changes in time 
trends or state trends. This regression also controls for individual level covariates, 
including sex, marital status, employment status, age, age squared, and income. It also 
controls for external macroeconomic shocks by including the state-year 
unemployment rate.  
The ACS data set contain the same key independent variable and covariates 
but the dependent variables are different. In this data set, we look at whether an 
individual has investment income, whether an individual has investment income over 
$2,000, and the natural log of investment income. Note that the natural log of 
investment income can only be generated for positive nonzero levels of investment 
income, which is why the sample size is smaller for this regression (N=227,027 
compared to N=3,998,806 in other regressions). 
The validity of our design depends on the exogeneity of the introduction of the 
extended parental coverage laws. Specifically, it is important that there is no 
legislative endogeneity and that these laws were not passed as a result of certain 
trends in financial outcomes. Most of the expansions in parental coverage laws in the 
2000s were passed towards the end of the decade when the global economy faced a 
recession and many people experienced poor outcomes. To take this possibly 
confounding event into account, we control for characteristics of the macro-economy 
by controlling the state-year unemployment rate. The key identifying assumption for 
this model is that in the absence of extended coverage laws, trends in financial 
outcomes would evolve similarly over time in states that did and did not adopt the 
laws. We conduct a number of robustness checks that probe the validity of this 
assumption, as detailed below. 
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The number of observations varies for each outcome variable in the BHIS for 
several reasons. Financial outcomes were not collected every year of the survey; for 
example, information on whether a respondent has declared bankruptcy was only 
collected in three surveys whereas information on whether the respondent has had 
difficulties paying her or her medical bill was collected in all six surveys. Data on 
whether individuals had difficulties paying for necessities and whether they used up 
all of their savings were collected in five surveys, and the difference in the number of 
observations is attributed to respondents refusing to answer the questions.  We 
calculate the standard error by clustering at the state level.  This mitigates the effect of 




Table 4 presents estimates for bankruptcy and financial hardship outcomes for young 
adults. The effect of being eligible for health insurance under parental coverage laws 
on bankruptcy, as shown in column 1, is -0.0451 and is statistically significant at the 
10 percent level. The magnitude of this coefficient implies moving from being 
ineligible to being eligible for health insurance under these laws reduces the 
likelihood of declaring bankruptcy by 4.51 percentage points. To gauge the economic 
significance of this coefficient, we find that it decreases the risk of bankruptcy by 
around 66 percent. Given the bankruptcy rate of the sample is 6.8 percent, a 4.5 
percentage point decrease in this rate for the eligible group reflects a huge reduction 
in the risk of bankruptcy.  
As shown in column 2 of Table 4, the effect of being eligible for dependent 
coverage on the financial hardship index, is -0.168. Although this coefficient is not 
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statistically significant, its magnitude indicates being eligible for health insurance 
under parental coverage laws relative to being ineligible reduces financial hardship by 
0.168 standard deviations. This suggests that eligible individuals experience a smaller 
magnitude in financial hardship relative to ineligible individuals.8, 9 The remaining 
three columns of Table 4 show the regression estimates for the individual components 
of the financial hardship index. All three results are suggestive of the effect we 
expect. While not statistically significant, they do provide economic significance. The 
estimates inform us that the likelihood of facing difficulties paying for necessities fall 
by 3.32 percentage points for those who became eligible for coverage under the laws. 
This translates to a 21.7 percent drop in the risk of being unable to pay for necessities 
for the eligible group from the mean of this sample. Likewise, a 1.54 percentage point 
reduction in likelihood of having difficulties paying for medical bills translates to a 
5.9 percent drop in such risk. The risk of having to use up most or all of one’s savings 
decreases by 3.6 percent. 
In Table 4, we also present the results of the regression for our control 
variables including the individual’s age, education level, employment status, and 
income. For the bankruptcy outcome in column 1, these variables are statistically 
significant. As expected, they affect an individual’s bankruptcy outcome 
meaningfully. Hence it is important to have controlled these variables, and their 
significance suggests the controls are implemented correctly. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Since the index is calculated by averaging across the standardized z-score measures of each 
dependent variable, the mean of the financial hardship index is 0.132 and the standard deviation is 
2.43. We can think of the 0.168 standard deviation decrease in the index as capturing a smaller 
dispersion from the mean of the index for the eligible group relative to the ineligible group. This means 
there are fewer eligible individuals that experience greater financial hardship relative to ineligible 
individuals. 
9 An alternative way of constructing this index is to simply aggregate the components of the financial 
hardship index. When we do this, we find the results behave in the same way as the results from the 
original index presented in the paper.	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Table 5 presents estimates for the impact of the law on investment income. 
We find that being eligible for the law increases the likelihood of having investment 
income by 0.05 percentage points and it increases the likelihood of having investment 
income over $2,000 by 0.03 percentage points. If we compare the magnitude of these 
effects to their mean, we find that eligibility for the law increases the chances of 
having investment income by less than one percent. In column 3, we find being 
eligible for health insurance coverage under extended dependent coverage laws 
reduces the level of investment income by 10.3 percent and this estimate is 
statistically significant at the one percent level. This seems to contradict our 
hypothesis, as we assumed being eligible for the law would lead to better financial 
outcomes, meaning we expected a positive coefficient. This decrease suggests eligible 
individuals have lower investment incomes than ineligible individuals as a result of 
this law. We probe our results further in the next section. 
Our key identification assumption in this model is that there would be no 
differential changes in outcomes between the eligible and ineligible group in the 
absence of this law. We investigate the trends in outcomes before and after the 
adoption of parental coverage laws to test for the validity of the design. In this event 
study, our key independent variables are a series of interactions between eligibility 
and the years before and after a law was passed. Our regression specification is:  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!"# =  ∝ +𝛽𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒!"# + 𝜃!! 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟!! + 𝜃!! 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟!! +𝜃!! 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟!! + 𝜃! 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜃! 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜃! 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟! +𝜃! 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝛿𝑋!"# + 𝛾! + 𝛾! + 𝜀!"#        (2) 
where 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒!"# represents whether an individual is eligible for the law and 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟! 
where 𝑗 = −3,… ,3 represents the number of years away from the implementation of 
the law. For example, 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟!! is an indicator for a time period three years before a 
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dependent coverage law was adopted and 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟! is the year the law is implemented. 
We omit the indicator for three or more years prior to the adoption of the law to keep 
a meaningfully short event window. If the laws had a causal effect, we would expect 
these 𝜃 coefficients to be 0 in the pre-implementation period (for the years when 𝑗 = −3,−2,−1, 0).  We would then expect 𝜃 to be negative in the post-
implementation years and possibly growing with time since the law implementation. 
Similar to our prior method, we take the year of implementation as the actual year of 
implementation plus one.  
Table 6 presents the results of this exercise. These results rule out the presence 
of pre-trends that would lead to false findings for the bankruptcy effect. We 
hypothesized that the impact of extended parental coverage laws would lead to a 
decrease in financial distress after the law’s adoption, and the results in column 1 are 
consistent with our predictions. We present these results in Figure 2 and they show 
that prior to the implementation of the law, being eligible for these laws (e.g. having 
the characteristics that would make one eligible, if the law had already passed) 
relative to being ineligible had no differential effect on bankruptcy outcomes as the 
differences-in-differences estimates in the pre-period hovers around zero. However, 
once the laws are adopted, we observe a differential change in bankruptcy outcomes 
for the eligible population and this effect continues to be negative in the following 
years. The difference in outcomes between the eligible and ineligible population are 
statistically significant one year after the law was implemented. More specifically, 
there was a 7.57 percentage point decrease in the bankruptcy rate for the eligible 
population one year after implementation relative to the level of bankruptcy four or 
more years earlier. This event study lends credibility to our implicit assumption that 
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in the absence of parental coverage laws, the eligible and ineligible group would have 
had parallel trends in bankruptcy outcomes.  
However, we do not find as consistent results for the financial hardship index 
and its components. The estimates for difficulties paying for necessities in column 3 
are suggestive of a break in trend when the law is implemented. But there are some 
outliers in the trend, which suggests our results may be subject to the influence of 
outliers as a result of the limited data available.  
Table 7 presents the results of the event study for investment income 
outcomes. The results in column 3 are indicative of a differential trend in investment 
income beginning prior to the passage of the laws. One reason for this may be 
investment income was influenced by the 2008 financial recession. The recession 
severely impacted the housing market and stock market so the Federal Reserve 
slashed interest rates to virtually zero. Since investment income is partially defined as 
gains or losses in income from rent, dividends, and income, we can assume the 
recession affected investment income through intricate interest rate channels. To 
investigate this, we ran our main specification in equation (1) with a restricted sample 
between 2001 and 2007. Table 8 shows the results for level of investment income are 
no longer significantly negative when we exclude potential factors from the recession.  
Our main results on investment income seem to contradict our hypothesis but 
the results can be partially explained as capturing the effects of the global recession. 
We used investment income in our analysis because it is a readily available proxy for 
an individual’s asset holdings; however investment income is a flow variable that can 
vary greatly from year to year; for future research, it may be more relevant to consider 
a stock variable, which would be a better proxy for an individual’s wealth. However, 
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such variable is hard to find in a data set that also meets the other requirements of this 
project.  
 
VI. Robustness Tests 
To run robustness checks for our bankruptcy results, we rely on two falsification tests. 
The first falsification specification assumes the expansion in young adult dependent 
coverage and the ACA are implemented three years earlier than their actual year of 
adoption. The regression specification for this exercise is identical to equation (1) but 
we code eligibility differently. We recode the eligibility variable by shifting the year 
of implementation earlier by three years and then dropping observations from our data 
set of the individuals who became eligible for the law three years later.  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!"# =  ∝ +𝛽𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒!"# + 𝛿𝑋!"# + 𝛾! + 𝛾! + 𝜀!"#        (3) 
As shown in Table 9, the results of this exercise show the hypothetical laws 
lead to a tiny 0.06 percent increase in the likelihood of declaring bankruptcy. This 
lends support to our interpretation of the main results as reflecting a causal effect of 
the dependent coverage laws on bankruptcy. By hypothetically adopting the laws 
three years earlier than their actual adoption, we find the effect of being eligible leads 
to an almost zero change in the likelihood of declaring bankruptcy.  
However, the robustness results are not as clear in supporting the results for 
the financial outcomes. The hypothetical laws reduce financial hardship by 0.36 
standard deviations, which is larger than the original effect, and is now statistically 
significant. If we look at the individual components of the financial hardship index, 
we find larger and significant results. This does not necessarily mean extended 
parental coverage laws had the opposite effect of what we expected. Instead, it is 
suggestive of a “pre-trend” in the components of the financial hardship index in the 
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years leading up to the implementation of extended dependent coverage laws. If these 
outcomes were already on a downward trend, then the falsification test would have 
been capturing that effect. These results are confirmed in our previous event study. 
Similarly, the results for the level of investment income, presented in Table 10, are 
also suggestive of a pre-trend (which has been confirmed by estimates from our event 
study).  
The second specification in our robustness check is to look at the effect of the 
laws for a different demographic, which theoretically should not be affected by these 
laws. If we examined the effect of these laws on a sample of 31 to 40 year olds, we 
would expect these laws to have no effect on their financial outcomes. More 
precisely, these individuals are not directly eligible for the laws and most of them 
would not have children eligible for the laws. Hence the spillover effect for this group 
would be minimal, making them the ideal sample for checking robustness. The 
regression specification is identical to equation (3) but our key independent variable 
becomes 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟!"#, an indicator for the individual living in a state s during year t 
when the state has implemented the law.  
As shown in Table 11, the results of this regression confirm the law did not 
have the same effects for the older adults as it did for the young adults. The 
coefficient for bankruptcy turns out to be positive and small, lending support to our 
belief that there is no common trend in bankruptcy rates across the population.  
Also reported in Table 11, the magnitude of the coefficient for the financial 
hardship index and its components are around a third smaller than those in our main 
findings. These coefficients are negative, which suggest decreases in financial 
distress. However, these findings are much smaller in magnitude compared to our 
main findings and are similarly not statistically significant. It is plausible that there 
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are underlying trends influencing the financial outcomes of both younger and older 
adults. But the effect of the law is most pronounced on younger adults in terms of 
relieving their financial distress. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
In this paper, we present new evidence suggesting eligibility under expanded parental 
health insurance coverage laws can lead to significant reductions in bankruptcy risk. 
More precisely, this new eligibility for young adults significantly reduces the 
incidence of declaring bankruptcies for medical reasons by 4.51 percentage points, 
compared to their ineligible peers. Given the bankruptcy rate of 6.8 percent for the 
entire sample, this eligibility effect is large. 
 This main result passes several robustness checks using falsification tests and 
an event study. However, our results for other financial outcomes are generally 
mixed. Our findings for the impact of this eligibility for health insurance on the 
financial hardship index and its individual components are suggestive of a mitigating 
effect on bad financial outcomes but this is not conclusive. The sign of the effect is 
consistent with prior studies that have examined the impact of increased health 
insurance access on financial outcomes. One reason why we find a significant effect 
for bankruptcy but muted significant effects for other variables may be due to how 
these measures are defined; bankruptcies are well documented and well defined 
whereas it is unclear what the threshold is for individuals with “difficulties in paying 
medical bills.” This is left to the survey respondent to interpret. In some instances, 
this may lead to an underestimate because individuals may be transferring their 
medical bills to their credit cards. In other cases, this may lead to an overestimate 
because survey respondents may perceive a lower threshold for what “difficulties” 
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are. Thus having “difficulties” undefined leads to difficulties in interpreting what 
constitutes a financial burden for individuals. 
We can extrapolate our findings and hypothesize the ACA is likely to 
significantly reduce financial distress. Our results for extended parental coverage laws 
are significant for a bankruptcy effect and suggestive of decreases in other financial 
hardships. Since the reach of the ACA would be wider and able to cover more 
previously uninsured individuals, we expect these results to be stronger, more 
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FIGURE 1: U.S. Bankruptcy Rate, 1990 – 2012 
 
 



















































TABLE 1: States that passed Extended Parental Coverage Laws 
 
State 






.Colorado 2006 25 X 
.Connecticut 2009 26 X 
.Delaware 2007 24 X 
.Florida 2007 25 X 
.Georgia 2006 25 
 .Idaho 2007 25 X 
.Illinois 2009 26 X 
.Indiana 2007 24 
 .Iowa 2009 25 X 
.Kentucky 2008 25 X 
.Louisiana 2008 24 X 
.Maine 2007 25 X 
.Maryland 2008 25 X 
.Massachusetts 2006 26 
 .Minnesota 2008 25 X 
.Missouri 2008 26 X 
.Montana 2008 25 X 
.New 
Hampshire 2007 26 X 
.New Jersey 2006 31 X 
.New Mexico 2005 25 X 
.New York 2009 30 X 
.North Dakota 2009 26 X 
.Ohio 2009 28 X 
.Oregon 2009 23 X 
.Pennsylvania 2009 30 
 .Rhode Island 2007 25 X 
.South 
Carolina 2008 22 X 
.South Dakota 2005 24 
 .Tennessee 2010 24 X 
.Texas 2003 25 X 
.Utah 1994 26 X 
.Virginia 2007 25 
 .Washington 2007 25 X 
.West Virginia 2007 25 X 
.Wisconsin 2009 27 X 
.Wyoming 2009 23 X 
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    African-American 
Education 
    Less than High School 
    High School Graduate 
    Some College 
    College Graduate 
    Post-Graduate 
Married 
Employment 
    Full-time 
    Part-time 



















    Declared Bankruptcy 
    Financial Hardship Index 
    Difficulties paying for Necessities 
    Difficulties paying for Medical Bills 
    Used up all of Savings 
Health Insurance+ 
    Private Insurance 
    Public Insurance 
    Uninsured 
Number of Observations 
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    Less than High School 
    High School Graduate 
    Some College 
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    Personal Income (mean) 
Household Income as percent of FPL 
    0 – 100 percent of FPL 
    100 – 200 percent of FPL 
    200 – 300 percent of FPL 
    300 percent or more of FPL 
Financial Outcome 
    Has Investment Income 
    Has Investment Income over $2,000 
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Health Insurance+ 
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TABLE 4: Reduced Form Regression Estimates of the Impact of Eligibility under Extended 
Parental Coverage, BHIS 
 
   Components of Financial Hardship Index 





















 (0.0259) (0.150) (0.0226) (0.0384) (0.0187) 
Age 0.0411** 0.382** 0.0147 0.0959*** 0.0363 
 (0.0184) (0.155) (0.0334) (0.0296) (0.0281) (𝐴𝑔𝑒)! -0.000637* -0.00640** -0.000149 -0.00171*** -0.000525 
 (0.000377) (0.00315) (0.000698) (0.000600) (0.000570) 
Education -0.0211*** -0.205*** -0.0303*** -0.0340*** -0.0164** 
 (0.00544) (0.0331) (0.00537) (0.00999) (0.00611) 
Married 0.0128 0.797 0.00207 0.0296* 0.0329 
 (0.0144) (0.0984) (0.0175) (0.0161) (0.0196) 
Employment Status -0.000331* 0.00910 0.000748 0.00123 -0.000312 
 (0.000196) (0.00673) (0.000846) (0.000766) (0.00151) 
Unemployment Rate -0.00166 0.138 0.00812* 0.0293*** 0.0199* 
 (0.00586) (0.0525) (0.00457) (0.0102) (0.0107) 
Income -0.00609* -0.111 -0.0142*** -0.0244*** -0.0107*** 
 (0.00322) (0.0210) (0.00269) (0.00336) (0.00322) 
      












Observations 2,033 2,784 2,802 3,898 2,798 
R-squared 0.159 0.167 0.098 0.056 0.124 
All regressions include year and state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by state and are in parentheses. 


























TABLE 5: Reduced Form Regression Estimates of the Impact of Eligibility under 
Extended Parental Coverage, ACS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Has Investment 
Income 
Has Investment 
Income over $2,000 
Ln (Investment 
Income) 
    
Eligible 0.000523 0.000348 -0.103*** 
 (0.000961) (0.000238) (0.0235) 
Age -0.0184*** -0.00448*** 0.326*** 
 (0.00150) (0.000341) (0.0502) (𝐴𝑔𝑒)! 0.000364*** 0.000100*** -0.00488*** 
 (0.0000276) (0.00000727) (0.000952) 
Education 0.0164*** 0.00274*** -0.00909 
 (0.000482) (0.0000909) (0.00548) 
Married 0.00146*** 0.000379*** 0.00515* 
 (0.000128) (0.0000393) (0.00291) 
Employment Status 0.00465*** 0.00456*** 0.418*** 
 (0.000396) (0.000232) (0.0196) 
Unemployment Rate 0.000747 0.0000742 0.0199** 
 (0.000564) (0.0000854) (0.00930) 
Income 0.00000114 0.000000424 0.00000816 
 (0.0000000288) (0.0000000241) (0.000000236) 
 











Observations 3,998,806 3,998,806 227,027 
R-squared 0.053 0.015 0.067 
All regressions include year and state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by state and are in 


































Components of Financial Hardship Index 
 (3) (4) (5) 






Used all of 
Savings 
 











 (0.00992) (0.281) (0.0444) (0.0409) (0.0474) 
2 Years Prior Omitted -0.768 0.0206 -0.115** 0.0601 
  (0.375) (0.0707) (0.0544) (0.0614) 
1 Year Prior 0.00796 -0.134 0.00770 -0.00232 -0.0534** 
 (0.0188) (0.248) (0.0387) (0.0389) (0.0264) 
Year Law was Implemented 0.0138 0.0113 -0.0406 0.0465 0.00569 
 (0.0172) (0.304) (0.0291) (0.0590) (0.0362) 
1 Year Later -0.0757** -0.0563 -0.0368 -0.0493 0.0113 
 (0.0374) (0.253) (0.0400) (0.0508) (0.0340) 
2 Years Later -0.0245 -0.0526 -0.0476 0.0208 0.0112 
 (0.0305) (0.275) (0.0339) (0.0475) (0.0514) 
3+ Years Later -0.0559** 0.0267 -0.0272 -0.00197 0.0115 
 (0.0232) (0.279) (0.0273) (0.0387) (0.0232) 
Observations 2,033 2,784 2,802 3,898 2,798 
R-squared 0.164 0.168 0.102 0.061 0.129 
All regressions include year and state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by state and are in parentheses. 






























TABLE 7: Event Study Estimates of the Impact of Eligibility under Extended 
Parental Coverage, ACS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Has Investment 
Income 
Has Investment 











 (0.000835) (0.000286) (0.0319) 
2 Years Prior 0.000720 0.000724** -0.0266 
 (0.000792) (0.000285) (0.0278) 
1 Year Prior 0.000911 -0.0000721 -0.100*** 
 (0.000705) (0.000254) (0.0305) 
Year Law was Implemented 0.00102 -0.0000146 -0.117*** 
 (0.00124) (0.000312) (0.0318) 
1 Year Later 0.000748 0.000274 -0.145*** 
 (0.00148) (0.000290) (0.0394) 
2 Years Later -0.00172 0.000257 -0.122*** 
 (0.00171) (0.000433) (0.0354) 
3+ Years Later 0.000732 0.000658 -0.115** 
 (0.00147) (0.000440) (0.0489) 
Observations 3,998,806 3,998,806 227,027 
R-squared 0.053 0.015 0.067 
All regressions include year and state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by state and are in 





























TABLE 8: Reduced Form Regression Estimates of the Impact of Eligibility under 
Extended Parental Coverage, Restricted Years 2001-2007, ACS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Has Investment 
Income 
Has Investment Income 
over $2,000 
Ln (Investment Income) 
    
Eligible -0.000955 -0.000173 0.00885 
 (0.00123) (0.000812) (0.0573) 
Age -0.0247*** -0.00582*** 0.163*** 
 (0.00211) (0.000498) (0.0444) (𝐴𝑔𝑒)! 0.000490*** 0.000123*** -0.00192** 
 (0.0000389) (0.0000102) (0.000845) 
Education 0.0189*** 0.00301*** -0.00111 
 (0.000562) (0.000104) (0.00632) 
Married 0.00140*** 0.000391*** 0.00529 
 (0.000165) (0.0000523) (0.00428) 
Employment Status 0.00341*** 0.00487*** 0.416*** 
 (0.000464) (0.000252) (0.0218) 
Unemployment Rate -0.00161** -0.000176 -0.0184 
 (0.000785) (0.000436) (0.0225) 
Income 0.00000122*** 0.000000465*** 0.00000876*** 
 (0.0000000366) (0.0000000224) (0.000000323) 
Observations 1,821,054 1,821,054 121,454 
R-squared 0.056 0.016 0.068 
ACS data restricted to the years 2001 to 2007. All regressions include year and state fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered by state and are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the estimates are 



























TABLE 9: Falsification Test Estimates of the Impact of Eligibility under Extended Parental 
Coverage, 3 Years Prior to Implementation, BHIS 
 
   Components of Financial Hardship Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





















 (0.0112) (0.182) (0.0243) (0.0314) (0.0238) 
Age -0.0223 0.0836 -0.0298 0.0583* 0.0207 
 (0.0169) (0.197) (0.0407) (0.0323) (0.0363) (𝐴𝑔𝑒)! 0.000568 -0.000918 0.000686 -0.00101 -0.000271 
 (0.000351) (0.00397) (0.000844) (0.000662) (0.000719) 
Education -0.0113* -0.176*** -0.0274*** -0.0301*** -0.0121 
 (0.00572) (0.0460) (0.00749) (0.0111) (0.00855) 
Married 0.0206 0.0911 0.00102 0.0336* 0.0397* 
 (0.0159) (0.108) (0.0177) (0.0168) (0.0216) 
Employment Status -0.000175 0.00666 0.00153 0.000768 -0.00126 
 (0.000175) (0.00613) (0.00160) (0.000889) (0.00135) 
Unemployment Rate 0.00391 0.204*** 0.0153* 0.0423*** 0.0262** 
 (0.00510) (0.0613) (0.00764) (0.0133) (0.0126) 
Income -0.00755** -0.111 -0.0172*** -0.0233*** -0.00985** 
 (0.00333) (0.0245) (0.00338) (0.00360) (0.00383) 
Observations 1,373 2,076 2,090 3,186 2,086 
R-squared 0.218 0.178 0.107 0.057 0.131 
All regressions include year and state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by state and are in parentheses. 




























TABLE 10: Falsification Test Estimates of the Impact of Eligibility under Extended 
Parental Coverage, 3 Years Prior to Implementation, ACS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Has Investment 
Income 
Has Investment 











 (0.000659) (0.000251) (0.0238) 
Age -0.0180*** -0.00489*** 0.204*** 
 (0.00177) (0.000408) (0.0525) (𝐴𝑔𝑒)! 0.000358*** 0.000104*** -0.00263** 
 (0.0000322) (0.00000833) (0.000986) 
Education 0.0173*** 0.00290*** -0.00514 
 (0.000516) (0.0000968) (0.00545) 
Married 0.00155*** 0.000430*** 0.00571* 
 (0.000131) (0.0000399) (0.00316) 
Employment Status 0.00453*** 0.00500*** 0.431*** 
 (0.000429) (0.000239) (0.0199) 
Unemployment Rate 0.000676 0.00000259 0.0136 
 (0.000535) (0.000120) (0.0103) 
Income 0.00000118*** 0.000000449*** 0.00000806*** 
 (0.0000000307) (0.0000000226) (0.000000277) 
Observations 3,026,202 3,026,202 190,417 
R-squared 0.056 0.016 0.064 
All regressions include year and state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by state and are in 



























TABLE 11: Falsification Test Estimates of the Impact of Eligibility under Extended Parental 






Components of Financial Hardship Index 
(3) (5) (4) 
VARIABLES Bankrupt Financial 
Hardship Index 




Used All of Savings 
      
Spillover 0.0147 -0.265 -0.0236 -0.0440 -0.0278 
 (0.0321) (0.186) (0.0238) (0.0373) (0.0348) 
Age -0.0398 0.0879 -0.00714 -0.0543 0.0625 
 (0.0824) (0.410) (0.0590) (0.0598) (0.0639) (𝐴𝑔𝑒)! 0.000580 -0.00116 0.000117 0.000776 -0.000875 
 (0.00115) (0.00575) (0.000829) (0.000842) (0.000891) 
Education -0.00735 -0.147*** -0.0235*** -0.0130* -0.0166** 
 (0.00526) (0.0409) (0.00525) (0.00667) (0.00819) 
Married 0.0112 0.0494 -0.00840 0.00261 0.0442*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0803) (0.0116) (0.0193) (0.0161) 
Employment Status 0.0000793 0.00624 0.00120 -0.0000182 0.000993 
 (0.000652) (0.00898) (0.00104) (0.00129) (0.00162) 
Unemployment Rate 0.00546 0.152*** 0.0180** 0.0121 0.0204 
 (0.00901) (0.0531) (0.00713) (0.00901) (0.0123) 
Income -0.0130*** -0.186*** -0.0246*** -0.0356*** -0.0202*** 
 (0.00357) (0.0383) (0.00468) (0.00614) (0.00654) 
 

















Observations 1,731 2,750 2,764 3,701 2,762 
R-squared 0.131 0.197 0.125 0.072 0.129 
All regressions include year and state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by state and are in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate the estimates are significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
